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COMMENTS
A UNICAMERAL LEGISLATURE IN NEW YORK:
A REVIEW AND A PROPOSAL
All the people of a state cannot assemble, debate and vote upon their laws as
was done in ancient Athens. Instead, certain groups of the governed must choose
one of their number to speak for the rest in an assembly of other similarly chosen
men, called a legislature. The structure of this legislature, this gathering of
citizens who make laws, is the subject of this comment. Structure varies widely
from country to country. In some lands, lawmakers sit in two separate houses,
while in others a single house is found sufficient. A recent United States Supreme
Court decision, Reynolds v. Sims,' raised important questions as to the justifica-
tions of bicameralism; and so it might be profitable to consider whether New
York's lawmakers should all convene in one house, or whether they should con-
tinue to deliberate separately, as Senate and Assembly.
Toward this end, there follows an attempt to analyze the development of both
the bicameral and unicameral forms of legislature from historical, political, social
and geographical standpoints in order that the traditional Anglo-Saxon leaning
towards bicameralism may be tested against the realities of its origins. That
analysis will then be integrated with a study of these two legislative forms as
they exist in America today, pinpointing modern difficulties with the bicameral
bias. Finally, the discussion will focus on New York State, whose legislative
structure will be evaluated in light of a detailed proposal for unicameralism.
I. ORIGINS OF THE LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM
A. The Upper House
In 1295 King Edward summoned the nobles and prelates of the realm to
advise him on matters of state. They were requested to bring with them members
of the lower clergy, certain Knights of the shire, citizens and burgesses all chosen
by their fellows. The nobles had always deliberated separately in the Great
Council, and the clergy did not care to sit beside the sometimes unrefined lay-
men. So what could have been five Estates became the two houses of Parliament
that Great Britain knows today.2
The English House of Lords thus began as a kind of committee of nobles who
gave advice to the King on topics they thought important.3 Similarly, in the
1. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). In this case, the Court held that a plan of voter apportionment
for the election of members of the Alabama legislature was unconstitutional. The Alabama
House of Representatives was elected on what was supposed to be a population basis. Since
the Senatorial districts were not apportioned according to population, the Court held that
the voter's right of representation was infringed, and ordered both houses of the state legisla-
ture to be chosen on a population basis.
2. T. Cole, European Political Systems 57 (1959). By contrast, medieval Scotland had a
unicameral legislature because by Scottish tradition the Estates always sat and voted together.
R. Luce, Legislative Assemblies 4 (1924).
3. T. Cole, supra note 2, at 57.
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United States today, one of the functions of the Senate is to give advice and
consent to the President on his foreign policy.4 This advisory function of the
upper house is by no means unimportant.5 The usual reason given for having a
second house, however, is to make the lower chamber the "popular" one, the
house more responsive to the will of the whole population, but to keep the tipper
house as a moderating force upon the legislative process.0 Not all founders of
governments have subscribed to this view. The Abbe Sieyes, a French statesman
and political theoretician, made this comment on the function of an tipper house:
"If a Second Chamber dissents from the first, it is mischievous; if it agrees . . .
it is superfluous."'7 On careful study, this observation appears more flippant than
farsighted.
An illustration ascribed by some to George Washington indicates the view our
founding fathers took of an upper house. The people's opinion, said General
Washington, as he poured tea from his cup into his saucer, is this liquid; when
it is fresh from the kettle, here in the cup, it is still boiling; but in the saucer it
has sufficiently cooled so as to be potable.8 John Stuart Mill thought that this
function of enabling cooler deliberation of questions was of secondary impor-
tance, for he felt that any assembly worthy of representing the people would be
able to prevent hasty action. Rather, he observed that the danger of concen-
trated power was the true justification for a bicameral legislature: "The con-
sideration which tells most, in my judgment, in favour of two Chambers . . . is
the evil effect produced upon the mind of any holder of power, whether an
individual or an assembly, by the consciousness of having only themselves to
consult." 9
The upper house often possesses extra or specialized functions. Sometimes it
is so organized as to give different interests a hand in government, which these
vital interests might not otherwise have. The Irish Parliament is organized in
this fashion. The lower house is a popularly elected chamber, while the head of
state may fill certain seats in the upper house from outstanding members of the
trades, professions, and other economic and social groups. 10 It is intended that
these men will insure that the vital community interests which specifically con-
cern their group will not be overlooked."
In France, unicameralism was always advocated by republican groups, and
they have sometimes succeeded in taking away important powers from the tipper
chamber when the constitution has been redrawn. The Council of the Fourth
Republic, for example, shared in electing the President of the Republic and
4. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
5. H. Schwarz-Liebermann von Wahlendorf, Struktur und Funktion der Sogenanten
Zweiten Kammer (1958).
6. The Federalist No. 63 (Madison).
7. J. Marriott, Second Chambers 1 (1910). For a full treatment of the part Sieyes took
in the French revolution, see A. Cobban, 1 A History of Modern France 165-67 (1962).
8. Lippmann, "The One Man, One Vote Rule," Newsweek, May 10, 1965, at 33.
9. J. Mill, Representative Government 249 (Henry Regnery Co. ed. 1962).
10. Ireland Const. arts. 18-19.
11. K. Wheare, Legislatures 214 (1963).
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tested the constitutionality of laws, 12 but only after 1954 could it consider a bill
before the lower house had completed its action on the bill. 13 In the Fifth
Republic, the name "Senate" is restored and its power is increased, but the will
of the lower house still prevails in case of deadlock between the two houses. 14
The Senate is thus less of a quasi-cabinet than the old CouncilY1
It might be mentioned that the upper house often functions as a court of last
resort. Both the House of Lords in England' and the Senate of New York
State17 preserve some of their once extensive judicial power.
One might be tempted to guess that a bicameral legislature is the hallmark
of an old, established and conservative government. But outward indicia are
frequently misleading. The Soviet, or legislature of the U.S.S.R., has two houses:
the Soviet of Nationalities and the Soviet of the Union.' 8 On the other hand,
New Zealand adopted a one chamber legislature in 1950 under a conservative
government.' 9 Similarly, a conservative administration abolished the upper house
in Denmark in 1953.20
In countries with a federal plan, states which are the political sub-divisions
have on occasion moved from two to one chamber legislatures in times of political
or economic uncertainty. The unicameral legislature of Queensland, Australia,
held its first session in 1922 in the uncertain times following World War I;21 the
first session of Nebraska's unicameral legislature occurred in the depression year
of 1937.22 In any event, it seems evident that the structure of a legislature is not
a simple predictable result of current political feeling. But changes in the struc-
ture of a legislature may well indicate the essential forms of legislative activity.
B. Scandinavian Parliaments
Legislatures of the Scandinavian countries have certain features which illus-
trate what it is a legislature must do and how the lawmaking body is organized
in order to do it. The Norwegian national legislature, called the Storting, consists
12. There is no principle of judicial review in French jurisprudence. T. Cole, supra note
2, at 225-26, 301.
13. Id. at 222-23.
14. France Const. arts. 45-46.
15. T. Cole, supra note 2, at 300.
16. Four Lords of Appeal, presided over by the Lord Chancellor, compose the supreme
tribunal of the kingdom. All other members of the House may join them in making up the
court; but only a few, and those with legal training only, ever do. 9 Halisbury's Laws of
England 363 (3d. ed. 1954).
17. The Court for the Trial of Impeachments is composed of the President of the Senate,
the Senators, and the Judges of the Court of Appeals. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 24; N.Y. Code
Crim. Proc. §§ 12-13.
18. U.S.S.R. Const. arts. 32-33; H. Schwarz-Liebermann von Wahlendorf, supra note Z,
at 159, sees the upper chamber as a bulwark against totalitarianism, and explains the Soviet
upper chamber as a necessary outlet for nationalism in a supposedly federal state.
19. N.Y. T'imes, July 26, 1950, § 1 at 12, col. 5.
20. N.Y. Times, May 29, 1953, § 1 at 6, col. 3.
21. Pierce, The State that Abolished its Senate, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1922, § I at 625
(Current History Magazine).
22. N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1937, § 1 at 4, col. 2.
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of 150 members elected every four years. These members assemble and choose
38 of their number to constitute an upper house, the Lagting; the rest sit as the
lower house, the Odelsting.m Although both houses consider the budget, only
the Odelsting may initiate legislation. 24 The reason why two houses, whose
members have the same qualifications, should have differing functions may not
at first be apparent. The framers of the Norwegian Constitution evidently felt
that one house should be concerned with proposing laws and starting the legisla-
tive process, but that the second, smaller chamber should be left free to give
the legislation, as proposed, careful and mature consideration. The legislators
themselves determine which of them shall principally introduce ideas, and which
shall principally reconsider them.
25
The Icelandic Althing is of similar structure to the Norwegian Storting, that
is, the whole parliament is elected at once and then divides itself into two
houses.26 As in Norway, only the lower house may initiate legislation; but here
financial matters are reserved for joint session.2 T Icelandic representative govern-
ment, however, exhibits certain unique features. Voters must be of excellent
character and show financial responsibility.28 Article 48 of the Constitution
provides, "Members of the Althing are bound solely by their convictions and
not by any orders of their constituents." Not only are the qualifications for
voting strict, but representatives of the people are directed by the constitution
to place their better judgment over the expressed interests of the electorate. It
might seem that this is less a representative government and more a system which
permits the electorate to choose a man who will make decisions for them. And
these decision makers have no choice but to separate into two houses because
men who must speak for the common good more than they speak for specific
interests must take extra precaution that their actions will not override vital but
unrepresented interests. On the other hand, it might be said that Article 48
simply puts the basic responsibilities of any representative into the constitution
in a very explicit way, rather than leave the area in doubt, as many countries do.
Sweden began with a legislature of four houses: the Clergy, the Nobility, the
Provincial Council and the People. In 1866 the present bicameral structure was
adopted.29 The 150 members of the upper house are chosen for eight year terms
by electoral colleges which assemble throughout Sweden every year to elect one
eighth of the members of the upper house, which is a continuing body. Seats in
this house are redistributed among nineteen electoral districts every ten years
on the basis of population. The 230 members of the lower house sit for four
years. They are chosen by direct election from twenty-eight districts, different in
size from those used for the election of the upper house.30 In general, both houses
23. Norway Const. art. 49.
24. Norway Const. arts. 75-76.
25. L. Orfield, Growth of Scandinavian Law 175-82 (1953).
26. Iceland Const. art. 32.
27. Iceland Const. art. 42.
28. Iceland Const. art. 33.
29. L. Orfield, supra note 25, at 260.
30. Id. at 261.
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have equivalent powers. In case of disagreement between the two, however, a
combined vote is taken, and so the numerically stronger lower house generally
prevails.31
The system of choosing the members of the upper house indirectly is suitable
for a constitutional monarchy like Sweden. Popular election of the lower house
is offset by the opportunity for balancing interests through the electoral colleges.
And although the lower house has the final say in a close question, the upper
house provides the moderation characteristic of a constitutional monarchy.
Generally, then, Scandinavian legislatures offer examples of the typical use
of a second chamber in the legislative branch of government. In two of these
countries, the legislature is elected as a single body, but then divides itself into
two houses, ostensibly so that the lawmakers can have a second look at what
they have done, but probably also because a broader, less parochial concern for
the common good obtains in a two house parliament. Finally, a second chamber
is generally thought to stand for moderation and conservatism. Members of
Sweden's upper house would seem to be chosen by a process which reflects a
trust in the idea of an indirectly elected house to moderate legislation.
C. Early American Unicameral Legislatures
The history of the United States shows much tinkering with legislative struc-
ture. An easy explanation for the existence of bicameral legislatures in colonial
times is their similarity to the British Parliament, but their true origin may
have been in the early colonial corporations from which they evolved. Many of
the colonies were chartered as what today might be called membership corpora-
tions. In the Massachusetts Bay Company, as in most of the other colonial cor-
porations,3 -2 strife arose between the "magistrates" or board of directors and a
committee of the members who were sent to discuss problems with them. The
governor, in order to conciliate the members, then empowered this committee,
or group of "deputies" as they were called, to act as a permanent advisory board.
At first, the magistrates and deputies sat together; but when the representatives
of the people began to seek independent powers, they also began to hold separate
sessions. Then the magistrates tried to keep power by "packing" the upper
chamber.3 3 Moves like this were countered, in New Jersey for example, by
refusal of the Burgesses to vote approval of the governor's actions for seven
years-1668 to 1675-until the governor acceded to their demands.34 By the
time of the revolution, the lower houses had generally succeeded in surpassing
the upper houses in importance.35
After the revolution, some states continued to function under their colonial
charters. Others set up governments which relied much on the discretion of the
legislature and severely limited the powers of the executive, for memories of
31. Id. at 262.
32. R. Luce, supra note 2, at 7-15.
33. In case of deadlock, a combined vote was taken. The normally more numerous deputies
could be defeated if more magistrates than deputies were in office. Id. at 17-18.
34. Id. at 18.
35. Id. at 47-57.
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heavy handed colonial governors were quite fresh. Executive power was often
divided between the governor and the upper house, or else it was placed in an
executive council, of which the governor was merely chairman.30
Forms of legislature were varied. New Hampshire's was elected as a whole,
and then divided itself.37 Maryland chose its lower house by direct election and
picked senators by means of an electoral college. 38 Virginia's senators, on the
other hand, were elected directly.39 The arguments of The Federalist were ex-
tremely influential in persuading the framers of many state constitutions to
choose the bicameral form of legislature. 40 Three states, Pennsylvania, Georgia
and Vermont, originally had single chamber legislatures.4 1 Only Vermont's en-
dured for an appreciable length of time, for the federal example was too strong
to be resisted in Pennsylvania and Georgia.42 It seems that while both Georgia
and Vermont based their constitutions upon Pennsylvania's, only Vermont made
extra provision for a real executive and thus permitted the unicameral system to
work efficiently.
As in Pennsylvania, Georgia's executive and legislative branches were so
closely linked as to be almost unwieldy. 43 The unicameral legislature in Georgia
was called the House of Assembly. Its sixty members were elected by the
counties on a population basis, with an interesting exception: the two port towns
of Sunbury and Savannah were allowed two and four members respectively, to
represent the trade. The House of Assembly then elected an executive Council
from its members, and the seats left vacant by those chosen were filled by a
special election. This Council of twelve members chose the governor, reviewed
legislation, proposed amendments, and could delay final enactment of bills
for five days. It had the responsibility of watching over the governor. Strong
central power was greatly feared, and the structure of the legislature expressed
this fear. A blanket clause in the constitution made "every officer of the State
... liable to be called to account by the House of Assembly." 44 These limita-
tions upon the executive branch were too stringent to be practical. In 1789 a
constitution was adopted which was a very close approximation of the Federal
Constitution. The unicameral form of legislature was lost by the addition of a
senate. A year later Pennsylvania followed suit by adding an upper chamber to
its legislature, over the objections of its prominent son, Benjamin Franklin, long
an advocate of unicameral legislatures. 45
Vermont has had the longest experience of any state with a single chamber.
36. Id. at 57.
37. Id. at 21.
38. Id. at 22.
39. Id. at 21.
40. Id. at 74.
41. C. Shull, American Experience with Unicameral Legislatures 9 (1937).
42. Id. Before the revolution, Pennsylvania had a unicameral legislature, but Georgia
used a bicameral system during colonial times. R. Luce, supra note 2, at 20-21.
43. See A. Saye, A Constitutional History of Georgia (1948).
44. Id. at 103.
45. Id. at 142.
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In her haste to establish a state government after independence, she gave little
consideration to the question of the desirability of a unicameral legislature, and
the first constitution was patterned upon that of Pennsylvania. Supreme legisla-
tive power was vested in a house composed of representatives of the townships,
which were really population units. There was a Council, which was the execu-
tive branch of government, and this had considerable legislative authority. Not
only was it a fairly strong executive arm, but it could also initiate and amend
legislation. Finally, there was a board of Censors made up of thirteen members
chosen by the people at large to serve for seven year terms. The Censors had
the power of constitutional review of legislation and later had the power to
initiate amendments to the constitution. It was these Censors who continually
agitated for the establishment of a senate and who finally had their way in
1836.46 This structure of state government did not call for a strict separation
of powers. The executive power was not in an individual, but in a group. It was
nevertheless strong and it had certain legislative functions which were used to
keep the legislature in check. Thus a balance of power was achieved without the
use of the federal-style separation of powers, but rather by what was more like
the old style colonial structure. The whole system was unlike anything in the
United States today.47
A study of this period in Vermont's history indicates that there was never any
great popular support for bicameralism during these years. 8 A comparison of
the ten years before and the ten years after 1836, when the first bicameral legis-
lature sat, indicates that the unicameral legislature was superior to its successor
in the wisdom of its financial policy, in the stability of the laws it enacted, and
in its lower cost of government.49 The addition of a senate was brought on not
by any dissatisfaction with the single chamber legislature but by the erratic and
troubled politics of those times.50 For the single chamber, described by the
censors as an institution both un-American and inherently vicious, was made
the whipping boy for these difficulties.51
Some feel that the problems met during this experience in Vermont offer no
real lessons for our times because problems in state government today are
greatly different from those seen in Vermont before 1836.52 It would seem, how-
ever, that the experience shows that considerable flexibility can be used to adapt
state government to problems confronting a particular state. And one theory of
government may not be the answer everywhere.
46. C. Shull, supra note 41, at 9-11.
47. Id. at 12.
48. Carroll, The Unicameral Legislature of Vermont, in 3 Proceedings of the Vermont
Historical Society 1, 16 (1932).
49. Id. at 32-45.
50. Id. at 24.
51. Id. at 26.
52. "The experience was brief and ... without any real lessons for our era." D'.lemberte
and Fishburne, The Unicameral Legislature, 17 U. Fla. L. Rev. 355, 358 (1964). A quick
arithmetical check will show that the unicameral legislature in Vermont lasted fifty-nine
years, 1777 to 1836, while Nebraska's so far has endured for hardly thirty.
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II. MODERN AMERICAN LEGISLATURES
A. The Unicameral System
Today unicameralism flourishes in Nebraska and in numerous city govern-
ments throughout the United States. Nebraska's voters authorized a single
chamber legislature in 1934,53 and the first session was held in 1937.4 Prior
to the change, there had been much interest and lively debate on both sides of
the question. In the van of those in favor of the transition was Senator George
Norris who had been an early champion of unicameralism. There had been much
dissatisfaction with the legislature in Nebraska for some time before 1935. A
joint legislative committee in 1915 recommended simplifying legislative proce-
dure, and, in addition, the establishment by constitutional amendment of a
single chamber legislature with more members than the Senate of the time but
fewer than the House. A test vote showed the electorate almost evenly divided
on the subject; but when the depression made itself felt, the advocates of the
single chamber knew that the time for success had come. Senator Norris, noting
that the qualifications and duties of Senators and Representatives were the same,
argued that the saving to the taxpayers would be considerable if Nebraska had
only one chamber. It would certainly employ less people, and it might make
them more efficient. 50 The move was opposed by some who sincerely believed in
the soundness of the bicameral system. Most orthodox party adherents opposed
the amendment for many reasons, especially on the side issue of the election of
legislators on a non-partisan basis. The amendment5 7 was approved at the polls
by an overwhelming majority of the votes cast.15
Members of the new single-house legislature were to be elected from one-
member districts for four year terms, and half of the legislature was to be re-
elected every two years.59 Formerly the entire membership could change at one
election, although in practice it never changed more than one-third.00 Legislators
were made aware of their own and their colleagues' votes by an electric roll call
system.01 They had the benefit of the Nebraska Legislative Council which studies
social and governmental needs, drafts proposed legislation in proper form, pro-
vides legal research and furnishes adequate copies of all pending bills well in
53. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1934, § 1 at 3, col. 1.
54. N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1937, § 1, at 4, col. 2.
55. The Model State Constitution of the National Municipal League (1921) made pro-
vision for a unicameral legislature. See also A. Johnson, The Unicameral Legislature 134-36
(1938).
56. See generally Senning, The One-House Legislature in Nebraska, 13 Neb. L. Rev.
341 (1935).
57. Neb. Const. art. III, § 1.
58. Senning, supra note 56, at 345.
59. Neb. Const. art. III, § 7.
60. Srb, The Unicameral Legislature-A Successful Innovation, 40 Neb. L. Rev. 626,
628 (1961).
61. Day v. Walker, 124 Neb. 500, 247 N.W. 350 (1933) provides judicial sanction for this
electric system; an interesting, if somewhat narrow-minded discussion of the device appears
in the dissent of Judge Rose.
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advance of legislative action.62 No vote may be taken until a bill has been on
public file for five legislative days, and no final enactment may be made until
it has been out of this file and on the desks of the members for one day. 3 There
are 43 members, each representing roughly 34,000 electors, 4 and they are elected
without their political affiliation marked upon the ballot.6s5
Nebraska is not the only example of unicameralism in the United States.
Despite the obvious disparity between a state legislature and a city council, a
brief examination of urban government on this subject should prove illuminative.
Originally, the city corporation was controlled by a council made up of a mayor,
aldermen and councillors all sitting together. The council often exercised judicial
as well as executive and legislative powers.66
The federal example made bicameral city councils popular. Philadelphia
adopted a double chamber council in 1796,67 and this became the pattern for
cities throughout the United States. The Federal Constitution was not slavishly
imitated in Philadelphia because every branch of city government was made
weak and closely responsible to the people.6 8 New York City clung to the
bicameral form the longest until 1936, when a plan was adopted which at least
approaches a unicameral system. The City Council was established as the legisla-
tive body, while the Board of Estimate was retained for important financial
functions, but could no longer initiate measures or amend them.6 0
The Model City Charter of the National Municipal League first advocated
unicameral city councils in 1900 and still suggests unicameralism as the ideal
form of municipal legislature. 70 Most city councils today are composed of one
representative from each ward or district, with the mayor occasionally selected
by the council. The exact duties and qualifications of the executive vary widely,
but in general the council's function is both advisory and legislative. Uni-
cameralism has, in this form, proved an effective, workable system of urban
government.
B. Bicameral Systems
Thus it appears that the single chamber city council is the rule in municipal
government. On the state scene, however, two chambered legislatures are
favored. The functions and advantages of the upper house have been mentioned
-to advise the executive, to moderate legislation, to guarantee a representation
of the best interests of the state and, occasionally, to act as the court of last
62. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 50-402 (1965).
63. Neb. Const. art. HI, § 14; Rules of the Nebraska Legislature Nos. 10-12.
64. These statistics are taken from the Book of the States and are based upon the most
recent census figures available (1966).
65. Neb. Const. art. M, § 7.
66. C. Shull, supra note 41, at 13.
67. T. Reed, Municipal Government in the United States 60 (1926).
68. Id. at 61.
69. 7 New York State Constitutional Convention Committee 1938, Problems Relating to
Legislative Organization and Powers 126 (1938) (hereinafter cited as 1938 Convention).
70. National Municipal League, Model City Charter (6th ed. 1964).
71. National Municipal League, Forms of Municipal Government 12 (1939).
1967]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
resort. But it is undoubtedly the strong example of the federal system which
makes bicameral state legislatures so numerous. The best authorities72 indicate,
however, that the federal system is based primarily on the Connecticut Compro-
mise73 and the problems which that plan settled, and secondarily on the theo-
retical advantages of the bicameral system.74
Although there are many historical reasons for having a legislature of two
chambers, there are pragmatic ones as well. The analogy to the federal plan,
making a bicameral state legislature readily understood by the ordinary citizen,
is an obvious example. Of chief importance, however, is the concept of checks
and balances. It would seem that the very nature of a legislature calls for a
balancing of interests. Where one house might be excessive, the other, it is hoped,
would be moderate and tend to balance the final legislative product. There is,
then, opportunity for careful and mature deliberation where one house can
rule upon the other's work product. In other words, a second chamber allows a
second, independent look at proposed legislation, and thus bicameral legislatures
are thought to be more conservative and less apt to enact hurried laws. The
result is fewer but wiser laws, enacted without fanfare. 76 A bicameral system
can also provide better representation. Formerly, this meant representation of
special classes or economic interests, 76 or representation of political subdivisions.
A second house also can be used to cross-section the electorate and thus insure
fair representation.
If these facets of a bicameral legislature are assumed to secure their desired
result, the moneys saved by any unicameral system would be a concededly false
economy. The small saving in taxes would be at the cost of poor representation
and clumsy laws.
Before a practical criticism of two house legislatures is made, 77 a recent
mathematical study which discovered a serious defect in the bicameral system
should be noted. 78 This study indicates that the two house system of representa-
72. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 574-75 (1964).
73. This was the plan whereby the smaller states were guaranteed an effective voice in
the federal government. Every state could send two Senators to the Federal Senate, while
membership of the House of Representatives was based on population. Thus the smaller
states had equal voice with the larger states in the Senate, while the larger states had their
interests protected in the House. It will be recalled that the Congress under the Articles of
Confederation was unicameral. See text accompanying note 153 infra.
74. C. Shull, supra note 41, at 25 seems to think that the arguments for bicameralism In
The Federalist were an afterthought to buttress the bicameral federal plan made necessary
under the Connecticut Compromise.
75. It was once felt that a two chambered house was more difficult to corrupt, and thus
secure against lobbies. But it has long been recognized that a small upper house, once cor-
rupted, can block good legislation and effect the same result as if the entire legislature were
corrupt. See D. Colvin, The Bicameral Principle in the New York Legislature 184-85 (1913).
76. Sir Henry Manning, in discussing the problem for New South Wales, says in The
Upper House, The People's Safeguard 1856-1953 (1953) that the upper house should be
indirectly elected on a nonpartisan basis, while the lower house should be chosen directly by
partisan ballot.
77. See part III infra.
78. J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (1962).
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tion introduces an element of uncertainty as to vote responsibility which is not
present in the one house system. It is demonstrated by probability models that
the bicameral system involves considerably higher decision making risks than a
unicameral system, if we assume both houses are chosen on the same basis, for
example, population. This means that a final count of the votes on a measure
in a bicameral legislature does not necessarily show how the electorate feels
about the measure; indeed, the high probability that the bicameral legislature
will vote contrary to the electorate leads to a general disapproval of the two
house system.79
III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A BICaERAL LEGISLATURE:
A VIEw OF NEW YORK
A. New York Legislature
The New York legislature may indicate whether the bicameral system is
effective because of the reasons advocates of that system advance. The complex
task of apportioning New York's 150 Assembly and 58 Senate seats 0 was
accomplished in a manner which at least attempted to perpetuate the state's
Republican majority.8 ' New York's present apportionment by population, both
for Senate and Assembly, uses a citizen, rather than resident or voter base.82
New York has one of the most vigorous two party systems in the nation.83
Thus, party discipline in both houses of the legislature is tight.84 It is said that
dissenting votes are cast only at the direction of the floor leaders,s and most
of the deliberation occurs off the floor of the legislative chamber during the
various steps of committee action on a bill.8 6 This particular process has itself
been the object of reform, 87 and satisfaction with the improvements is said to
rival that which followed the changes in Nebraska thirty years ago. The
governor takes considerable part in the legislative process,88 and this, combined
with the well organized party lines in the legislature, means that the process of
enacting laws often becomes a series of bargains between the two house leaders
and the governor.89
79. Id. at 234.
80. N.Y. Const. art. III, § 2; N.Y. State Law § 121 (Supp. 1967).
81. F. Munger & R. Straetz, New York Politics 61 (1960). The fear in 1896 was that a
heavily Democratic New York City would control any legislature apportioned strictly on
population, and so an equalizing weight in the Senate was given to the upstate rural land
areas, which generally voted Republican.
82. N.Y. Const. art. III, §§ 4-5.
83. F. Munger & R. Straetz, supra note 81.
84. See, e.g., D. Colvin, The Bicameral Principle in the New York Legislature (1913);
F. Munger & R. Straetz, supra note 81; W. Moscow, Politics in the Empire State (1948).
85. F. Munger & R. Straetz, supra note 81, at 61.
86. Report of N.Y. Joint Legislative Committee on Legislative Practices and Procedures,
March 24, 1959, Leg. Doc. No. 21, at 17.
87. Id. at 24.
88. N.Y. Coast. art. IV, §§ 3, 7.
89. See generally Bureau of Municipal Research, The Constitution and Government of
the State of New York-an Appraisal (1915). See also F. Munger & R. Straetz, supra note 81.
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In 1913, David Colvin's study of the possibility of a unicameral legislature in
New York State raised many interesting questions on legislative functioning. 0
Some of the answers have as much validity today as they had then, even when
tested by more recent studies.91 The entire examination was based on the hy-
pothesis that the clash between the two houses assures superior legislation for
the common good. Colvin found that in practice there was anything but a clash
between houses and that checks and balances worked independently of the bi-
cameral structure. 92 It has always been expected that the second chamber will
review and criticize a bill received from the other house independently. More
often than not the measure has already been the subject of diligent committee
research, including, perhaps, painstaking studies by scholars in the particular
field of the bill, or even hearings with considerable publicity and controversy.
Hence, the reading of a bill in one house, after passage in the other, seldom takes
anyone by surprise. More important, the legislator in the second house will al-
ready have been exposed to the merits of the bill and will often rely on the
recommendation of the committee concerned, especially if it is a joint com-
mittee. "The fact that some of the most difficult work of legislation is undertaken
by joint committees acting in co-operation is a significant commentary on the
theory that legislation can best be accomplished through conflict between the
two houses."1
93
In New York, the conflict theory often fails to work either way. The second
house is sometimes used as an excuse for the failure of a popular, but in the eyes
of the legislators, bad measure. The story is told94 of the time the Speaker of the
Assembly phoned the Senate majority leader about the flood of bad bills the
Senate was approving that year, confident that the Assembly would knock them
down. He told the majority leader that if the Senate passed and continued to
send over that kind of legislation-he used a shorter and more descriptive term
-he would have the Assembly pass it too, and how would the Senate like that?
The flood of bad bills slowed down. Obviously, this is not the sort of use which
proponents of the bicameral system intend to be made of the second chamber
when they speak of independent review. In its worst form, it permits the shirking
of legislative responsibility by providing a sort of ritual to keep constituents or
interests satisfied.
The individual legislator's responsibility can be cloaked by sending the mea-
sure to a committee for consideration, or to a joint committee of both houses.
The joint committee has been widely attacked as the greatest evil of the bi-
cameral system.95 For example, a bill requiring land registration in New York
90. D. Colvin, supra note 84.
91. It is unfortunate that recent accurate studies of the New York political scene are
rare. W. Moscow, supra note 84, and F. Munger & R. Straetz, supra note 81, are the most
recent and reliable works.
92. D. Colvin, supra note 84, at 190-91.
93. Id. at 71.
94. W. Moscow, supra note 84, at 172-73.
95. Merchant's Association of New York, A Unicameral Legislature Elected by Propor-
tional Representation (1938).
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City under the Torrens system was prevented from being enacted by means of
this device, although it had considerable support. 0 It is the secrecy of the method
that is most often attacked, and not its end result.97
New York's active political parties and vibrant two party system produce a
division of the legislature into voting blocks such as are found in very few other
states. Some studies s have found that the traditional belief in bitter conflict
between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas in certain state legislatures
does not exist. This "traditional belief" apparently arose from earlier studies of
the New York Legislature. Colvin, in his 1913 study of the legislature, found the
break between urban and rural legislators an established thing, 0 and the study
of unicameralism for the 1938 constitutional convention found this break an
argument for continuing the bicameral form. 00 The most recent study finds a
third group established, splitting New York State into urban, suburban and rural
voting blocks, where formerly it was a struggle between the New York City and
the "up-state" factions.' 0 ' New York City, heavily Democratic, is the object of
much fear and hostility in the legislature, 02 especially from suburban areas,
which are often the strongest Republican areas in the nation, ° 3 whereas smaller
cities often ally with rural areas.104 Thus, since legislative voting, arguably, follows
area and since area vote largely depends on party strength, it follows that party
lines, subject to area interest, are the most effective check in the legislature. 05
John Stuart Mill's argument of power accumulation' 0 6 has been questioned in
New York on the basis of party organization. Colvin, author of the previously
mentioned 1913 study of the legislature, 07 found that if there was any threat
of accumulation of too much power, it would be from the political party and not
from the Senate or Assembly. 108 He felt that the two party system in New York
is such as to render the danger of a single chamber usurping power to be un-
likely if not impossible. 1 9 Later studies indicate that this is still true, although
they reach differing conclusions. The 1938 study said that a one house legislature
would increase the power of the party machine that would come to dominate it,
but at the same time argued that the possibility of such domination might
become more difficult in a New York unicameral legislature. 110 The latest work
96. 1938 Convention at 136.
97. N.Y. "imes, Jan. 28, 1923, § 8, at 12, cols. 1-4.
98. See, e.g., Derge, Metropolitan and Outstate Alignments in Illinois and Missouri
Legislative Delegations, 52 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1051 (1958).
99. D. Colvin, supra note 84, at 108.
100. 1938 Convention at 140.
101. F. Munger & R. Straetz, supra note 81, at 61.
102. Id. at 55.
103. Id. at 55-56.
104. Id. at 55-65.
105. Id. at 61.
106. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
107. Note 84 supra.
108. D. Colvin, supra note 84, at 182-83.
109. Id.
110. 1938 Convention at 140.
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similarly finds that legislative structure does not prevent usurpation of power,
but the party contest does."'
The actual operation of the principle of checks and balances within the New
York legislature might, therefore, depend more on the vitality of party politics
than on bicameral structure. Colvin found that the political party is the real
factor in checking legislation, not the upper house.1 2 The 1938 study, while
concluding that control of two houses by different parties lent color to the argu-
ment for bicameralism," 3 failed to note that in this event party strength, and
not an inherent struggle between the houses, would be the decisive element. Later
studies confirm the view that the party is the real reason why there are checks
and balances within the legislature. 1 4 In New York, then, active political parties,
social relationships, similar constituencies and common interests of Senators
and Assemblymen together with a genuine interest in superior legislation, all
work to reduce conflict between houses of the legislature to the point where
checks and balances are effective for reasons totally unconnected with the
theoretical views on bicameralism.
B. New York After Reynolds
The much discussed case of Reynolds v. Sims"15 touched on the question of
whether a bicameral system for a state legislature continues to have validity
since both houses must be chosen on the basis of population.110 An examination
of this portion of the decision may suggest some present difficulties with con-
tinued adherence to bicameralism.
Under the Reynolds decision, state election systems should give approximately
equal weight to each vote cast.117 "Full and effective participation by all citizens
in state government requires, therefore, that each citizen have an equally effective
voice in the election of members of his state legislature." 1 8 This requirement
refers to the legislature as a whole, not just one house, in that, "as a basic con-
stitutional standard, the Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both
houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population
basis.""' 9
The Court examined the meaning of "population basis" in great detail, and,
since the possibility of using different population bases to distinguish the two
houses of a state legislature was raised later by the Court, it is necessary to ex-
amine this point further. It is well, however, to bear in mind the words of Mr.
Justice Harlan, dissenting: "people are not ciphers . . . legislators can represent
their electors only by speaking for their interests-economic, social, political-
many of which do reflect the place where the electors live." 120
Ill. F. Munger & R. Straetz, supra note 81, at 61.
112. D. Colvin, supra note 84, at 132.
113. 1938 Convention at 139.
114. W. Moscow, supra note 84, at 173; F. Munger & R. Straetz, supra note 81, at 61.
115. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
116. Id. at 576.
117. Id. at 562.
118. Id. at 565.
119. Id. at 568.
120. Id. at 623-24.
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The Court held that the Equal Protection Clause requires states to make
honest and good faith efforts to make election districts for both houses as nearly
equal in population as practicable. 12' While the determination of an exact popu-
lation-representation coefficient would of course meet this standard,'- ' the Court
held that mathematical precision in making electoral districts of equal population
would not be required. 1' Rather, high variations have been allowed,"" and an
apportionment which was "not the fairest" plan possible has been nevertheless
held valid.' 25 It is apparent, then, that some deviations from the equal popula-
tion principle are constitutionally permissible provided they are based on legiti-
mate considerations which are part of a rational state policy.'20 However, a
clear and rational policy may still subvert the population base and hence be
impermissible.
127
The population base can be residents, citizens or voters. 28 and flexibility in
choosing one over the other has been upheld. 12 9 For example, Virginia's practice
of permitting resident military personnel to vote was approved.130 The population
distribution in other states has reduced the basis distinction to insignificance.
After the constitutionality of New York's apportionment formulas had been
tested and found wanting, 13' a later connected case'13 2 had this to say about the
usefulness of different bases for apportioning the Senate and Assembly: "It
should also be noted that a change from citizen base to a resident base for
legislative apportionment would have but little impact on the densely populated
areas of New York State."' 33 Thus it would seem that the possibility of using
two houses in New York for cross representation must employ a method other
than different population bases.
Another traditional justification for bicameralism which comes under serious
scrutiny in Reynolds is its similarity to the federal system. The bicameral struc-
ture of the state legislature is often popularly explained by analogy to the Con-
gress of the United States. Astute observers have long realized, however, that
there is no real parallel between state and federal systems.1 3 4 The Congress
under the Articles of Confederation was unicameral, and the Connecticut Com-
promise attempted to grant smaller states an equivalent voice in national policy
121. Id. at 577.
122. Paulson v. Meier, 246 F. Supp. 36 (D.N.D. 1965).
123. 377 U.S. at 569, 577.
124. Moore v. Moore, 246 F. Supp. 578, 582 (S.D. Ala. 1965). See also Toombs v. ForLson,
241 F. Supp. 65, 67, 70 (N.D. Ga), aff'd, 384 U.S. 210 (1965).
125. Dungan v. Sawyer, 253 F. Supp. 352, 358 (D. Nev. 1966).
126. 377 U.S. at 579.
127. Id. at 581.
128. Id. at 577.
129. Holt v. Richardson, 240 F. Supp. 724, 726 (D. Hawaii 1965), vacated and remanded
on other grounds sub nom. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
130. Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964).
131. XAWMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964).
132. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y.), afi'd, 382 U.S. 4 (1965).
133. Id. at 925.
134. D. Colvin, supra note 84, at 182.
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out of respect for their sovereign status.135 Political subdivisions of a state,
however, are not sovereign portions of the state as the states themselves are
sovereign entities in the federal union; and for this reason the Reynolds Court
found "the federal analogy inapposite and irrelevant to state legislative district-
ing schemes."'1
3 6
Since state senates are not to be justified by the example of the Federal
Senate, what reason is there for having two houses in a state legislature? The
Court felt that there were ample reasons. Chief of these is "to insure mature and
deliberate consideration of, and to prevent precipitate action on, proposed legisla-
tive measures." 1 37 Whether this is so as a practical matter is questionable.
Despite its requirement of basing both houses' allotment of seats upon
population, the Court suggested the use of different constituencies in the two
bodies to produce a different composition or complexion."38 This idea was de-
veloped in later cases. In a case arising out of Connecticut, a district court held
that seats in the smaller house could be distributed so as to speak for a wider
constituency and, consequently, a broader spectrum of voters. 1 9 Members of this
house could, therefore, be expected to be less parochial in their examination of
a bill than members of the more numerous house.140 To make this broader view
possible in the one house, the Reynolds decision would permit the numerical size
of the second house to differ greatly from the first; the geographical size of the
election districts for each house to be greatly different; and the length of terms
of members to vary.' 4 1 However, it is well to note that a provision in the
Nebraska Constitution142 permitting no less than 20 per cent nor more than 30
per cent weight to be given to land area in the creation of legislative districts was
held not to comply with the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause by an-
other federal district court.'
4 3
Important in Reynolds v. Sims is the approval of apportioning seats in the
two houses so that representation in the legislature as a whole will be balanced
and fair. "[A] pportionment in one house could be arranged so as to balance off
minor inequities in the representation of certain areas in the other house."
44
The court in Holt v. Richardson,145 after quoting this passage with approval,
discussed the practicality, and the necessity, of assuring the "one man, one vote"
135. 377 U.S. at 574-75.
136. Id. at 573.
137. Id. at 576.
138. Id. at 576-77.
139. Butterworth v. Dempsey, 229 F. Supp. 754, 762 (D. Conn. 1964), aff'd sub nom.
Pinney v. Butterworth, 378 U.S. 564 (1965) (mem.).
140. Id.
141. 377 U.S. at 577.
142. Neb. Const. art. III, § 5.
143. League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 232 F. Supp. 411, 412 (D. Neb. 1964).
144. 377 U.S. at 577.
145. 240 F. Supp. 724 (D. Hawaii 1965), vacated and remanded sub nom. Burns v.
Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
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principle in Hawaii and required exactly this sort of cross representation in both
legislative houses. The court said,
[i]n reapportioning and redistricting the senate, both houses overlooked the fact
that, to be valid, the makeup of the senate must positively complement the makeup
of the house, to provide the vital equality of voter representation. Both houses of
the legislature seemingly forgot that the schemes of districting each house, when
conjoined, must offer compensating advantages to the voters-not only to those
voters within each representative district, be it senate or house, but to all voters
throughout the State.' 46
To assist the achievement of this balanced representation and to compensate
areas with relatively large numbers of inhabitants, 147 one house might include at
least some multimembered districts.1 48
The language in the Reynolds case indicating that there might be reasons
which would justify some variance of the strict population base requirement has
already been noted.149 In outlining one of these reasons the Court said, "[a]
consideration that appears to be of more substance in justifying some deviations
from population-based representation in state legislatures is that of insuring
some voice to political subdivisions, as political subdivisions." 150 The Court
noted that there were several reasons why a state should be able to do this in at
least one house of the legislature,' 5' but the Court cautioned that giving at least
one representative to each subdivision creates a "total subversion of the equal-
population principle" in that particular house of the legislature.152 The Court,
then, offered no solution to the practical problem of giving fair, if not equal voice
to political subdivisions while guaranteeing equal protection to citizens.
The Court did, however, mention three reasons for giving political subdivisions
this representation. Local government, when it has responsibilities incident to
the smooth operation of state government, should have some real voice in the
legislature.'3 Some local legislation, applicable only to local government, should
have a more formal consideration by this local government. 54 Use of political
subdivisions would, in the eyes of the Court, also help prevent the appearance of
that fearsome political reptile, the gerrymander. 55
A Missouri constitutional provision on this last point was approved in a
district court decision,156 but in that case the subdivisions had been drawn as
nearly equal in population as was possible. Different combinations of population
bases and political subdivisions plus adherence to the constitutional requirements
146. Id. at 729.
147. 377 U.S. at 579.
148. Id. at 577.
149. Note 126 supra and accompanying text.
150. 377 US. at 580.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 581.
153. Id. at 580.
154. Id. at 580-81.
155. Id. at 581.
156. Jonas v. Hearnes, 236 F. Supp. 699, 707 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
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may some day prove practical. A recent Vermont case' 57 presented such a situa-
tion. There, statutes providing for the redistricting of the state Senate along
county lines on the basis of total residents with multi-member districts and for
the redistricting of the state House of Representatives along town lines on the
basis of registered voters, also with multi-member districts, were held valid under
the constitutional requirements outlined in the Reynolds case.',,
These somewhat flexible combinations emerge from the stringent Reynolds
decision as the most feasible method of making use of bicameral legislative
structure in New York. Although the different population bases may not be
suitable, 5 9 the preservation of the county as the basis for Senate seats seems
worthwhile as counties emerge once again as politically important, especially in
suburban areas like Nassau County.16 ° Channeling of New York's party strength
would then be on a firmer base than at present, and assure a meaningful bi-
cameral legislature.
IV. CONCLUSION: A PROPOSAL FOR A UNICAMERAL LEGISLATURE IN
NEW YORK STATE
After Reynolds v. Sims,161 it was the opinion of some that during the political
activity attending an attempt to apportion both houses of a state legislature on
the basis of population, it would be wise to examine the feasibility of a unicameral
system.162 It was argued that the population basis requirement diminished the
importance and usefulness of the upper chamber. 63 The prospect of a simpler,
more responsible and less costly legislative structure was appealing, and also
deserved consideration in view of the frequently exhibited characteristics of
reapportionment problems: they constantly recur, and their complexity invites
procrastination. 164 An examination of the Nebraska system will illuminate the
attractiveness of the features incorporated in the subsequent proposal for uni-
cameralism in New York.
The single chamber legislature has a simple structure and is easy to under-
stand. One man is chosen to represent his fellows, and he sits with other men,
chosen in a similar fashion to enact the laws which govern the community. This
is their responsibility, and if they fail, the breach of trust is readily detected.
Persons or groups having interest in legislation can present their opinions and
facts openly and legitimately, so that the stigma of lobbying is removed. Costs
of government are reduced, because fewer men are on the payroll and waste of
157. Buckley v. Hoff, 243 F. Supp. 873 (D. Vt. 1965).
158. Id. at 875.
159. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916, 925 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 382 U.S. 4 (1965).
160. Nassau County is the fifth strongest Republican district in the nation. Westchester
is second. F. Munger & R. Straetz, supra note 81. Proper recognition of this might go a long
way toward satisfying fears of New York City dominating the legislature.
161. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
162. D'Alemberte & Fishburne, The Unicameral Legislature, 17 U. Fla. L. Rev. 355,
367 (1965).
163. Lippmann, "The One Man, One Vote Rule," Newsweek, May 10, 1965, at 33; N.Y.
Times, Jan. 14, 1965, at 34, col. 5.
164. D'Alemberte & Fishbourne, supra note 162, at 367.
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effort and revenue is avoided, and the importance of the individual member in-
creases when jockeying between two houses and the burying of responsibility in
joint committee become impossible.'0 5
For example, indications are that the Nebraska Legislature has fulfilled all
the expectations of those who worked to bring it to its present form. 1 0 A good
deal of the satisfaction with the Nebraska Legislature is attributable to reforms
other than the abolition of the Senate,0 7 such as procedural reforms. It is felt,
however, that most of these would be less effective in a bicameral system. Much
importance is given to mandatory public hearings on bills.' 10 Also, representa-
tives of the press are favored with invitations to committee meetings.0 9 The
progress of work is more orderly than under two chambers, partly because of a
bill filing procedure which might not work well in a bicameral legislature. 1' A
bill is kept on general file at least three days after introduction and considera-
tion. Then, after appropriate hearings, it goes on select file, or second reading, for
consideration by the Committee on Enrollment and Review. The third reading
comes after two days on the desks of the members. This system is found to have
the effect of not only insuring mature deliberation and careful consideration of
bills, but also of enabling private citizens and interested groups to learn of details
of bills and to present their views to the appropriate committee. In this way, the
necessary and desirable features of lobby and pressure groups are retained, with
some of the abuses removed through easy public scrutiny.'-,
That the unicameral legislature would enable proper responsibility for legisla-
tive action to attach was one of the prime expectations of proponents of uni-
cameralism in Nebraska. It can be said that this is one of the most significant
accomplishments of the new form of legislature, and that the attempt to fix
responsibility was entirely successful.' 7 2
Another result of this system is that the progress of legislative work is orderly.
Bills do not pile up at the end of a session, so that unhurried consideration of
all matters presented is allowed. 17 3 Hearings of the Legislative Advisory Council
held in different parts of the state prior to a legislative session contribute toward
a more effective legislature and greater citizen participation in government.
174
165. See Alaska Public Administration Service, Constitutional Studies (1955); Hawaii,
Manual on State Constitutional Provisions (1950).
166. Nebraska Legislature, Brief Comparison of Bicameral and Unicameral Legislative
Systems and Rules and Law Governing Their Operation in Nebraska (1959).
167. Note that not all mention of "Senate" and "House of Representatives" is removed
from the Nebraska Constitution. See, e.g., Art. III, § 17. See State ex rel. Caldwell v. Peterson,
153 Neb. 402, 45 N.W.2d 122 (1950).
168. A. Brehkenridge, One House For Two, Nebraska's Unicameral Legislature 51 (1957).
169. Rules of the Nebraska Legislature No. 6.
170. Breckenridge, supra note 168, at 51.
171. Senning, Unicameralism Passes the Test, 33 Nat'l Munic. Rev. 60 (1944).
172. Srb, The Unicameral Legislature-A Successful Innovation, 40 Neb. L. Rev. 626,
632 (1961).
173. Senning, supra note 171, at 62. The bill filing system permits the volume of bills to
be evenly distributed throughout the legislative session.
174. Id. at 65.
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In determining whether the abstract advantages claimed for a unicameral
system have any practical merit, other proponents of unicameralism point to the
success of the single chamber city council.175 City government would seem,
however, to be too close to the electorate to make the federal style system of
checks and balances useful, or even meaningful.1 70 Furthermore, most municipal-
ities experience administrative or managerial needs to a far greater extent than
what might be called legislative needs . 1 7 Therefore, a simple and well repre-
senting council is perfectly adequate for the requirements of a municipality,
especially since its precise functions can be planned to fit the particular com-
munity.178 Whether success on the municipal level indicates similar prospects
for state government is not obvious. However, in summarizing the authorities it
might safely be ventured that a simple and efficient unicameral legislature can be
fitted with a wide variety of devices to insure that liberties, long guaranteed by
bicameral state legislatures, will be preserved by the unicameral system.
To demonstrate both the form of such a unicameral state legislature and
some of the protective devices which might be incorporated therein is the purpose
of the following proposal for a unicameral legislature in New York State. It is
designed to simplify the organization of the State's lawmaking body and improve
its functioning without sacrificing what has been found useful in the American
practice of employing checks and balances in government.1 7
The Senate will be abolished. There will be but one house of the New York
legislature, called the Assembly.' 80 The State of New York will be apportioned
according to law and divided into uniform electoral districts. These districts
would be larger than our present Assembly Districts; hence, the number of them
would be somewhat smaller. In each of these electoral districts the voters will
choose two of their number to represent them in the legislature. One of these,
called the short Assemblyman, will be chosen for a term of two years and will
stand for election in even numbered years only. The long Assemblyman will
retain his seat for six years. All Assemblymen, short and long, will sit together
when the Assembly is in session; and all Assemblymen have the same rights,
175. A. Johnson, The Unicameral Legislature 88 (1938).
176. Hagan, The Bicameral Principle in State Legislatures, 11 J. Pub. L. 310, 311 (1962).
177. See National Municipal League, Forms of Municipal Government 14 (1939).
178. C. Shull, American Experience with Unicameral Legislatures 13 (1937).
179. Proposals for a unicameral legislature in New York are not new. Both the 1914
Convention (A. Int. 1320, A. Pr. 1465, A.J. 866) and the 1938 Convention (Revised Record,
Int. 265, Am. 306, and Int. 613, Am. 641) gave formal consideration to the idea. One of the
proposals to the Temporary State Commission on the Constitutional Convention (1957) was
to study the feasibility of a unicameral legislature in New York. See the Second Interim
Report of this Commission, September 19, 1957, Leg. Doc. No. 57, at 23 (1937). The
Temporary State Commission on the Constitutional Convention (1967) has a cursory dis-
cussion of the question in Pamphlet No. 14 at 11. On June 6, 1967 Mr. Delegate Weissberg
of New York City proposed the adoption of a unicameral legislature by the Convention
(Proposition No. 799), but the measure was not passed.
180. Art. II, § 1(a) of the proposed (1967) New York State Constitution provides for
a Senate and an Assembly. The constitution was rejected by the voters at the polls in
November.
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preferences and duties. Their votes carry the same weight. Committees must
have at least as many short men as long. The two "classes" will not adjourn to
separate sessions, and in making its house rules, the Assembly may not prefer
one "class" over the other. At election time, all the short Assemblymen will
stand for election at the same time in the appropriate year and, every six years,
the long Assemblyman's seat will be the subject of a contest. In this way, the
Assembly will be a continuing body and, it is hoped, responsive to the changes
in the electorate, and yet not drastically influenced by any such changes.
Besides making allowance for changes in the electorate itself, this plan would
insure both a short term view and a cooler, more farsighted approach to pro-
posed legislation. Thus, the virtues traditionally associated with the bicameral
legislature will not be lost. It is expected that the long Assemblymen will exercise
the moderating influence of an upper house, without the cumbersome secrecy
with which the double chamber system functions presently in New York. Like-
wise, the short Assemblyman, ever conscious that his stay in the halls of power is
but one third as long as that of his distinguished colleague, will insure that legis-
lation will never be too far out of step with the temper of the electorate.
Bicameralism has lost one of the principal justifications for its continuing on
the public scene. And although this may seem to make the institution outmoded,
nevertheless the bicameral principle continues to have great validity and use in
state legislatures.181 From the ordinary citizen's standpoint it has great value as
a reminder that no one body in his government can ever take absolute power.
Even if the popular idea is not perfectly accurate in every detail, it might seem
unwise to replace an effective form of legislature with what would most likely
be a completely experimental one. Nebraska adopted a single chamber after years
of dissatisfaction with a clumsy and possibly suspect bicameral legislature.
There is much less dissatisfaction with the New York Legislature today, and the
quality of legislation is generally felt to be superior.182 Still we can echo Colvin's
remark of 1913, that "the trial of a safeguarded unicameral legislature would not
be a very dangerous experiment"1s 3
181. Experience in New York has shown that because strict party discipline keeps
Senators and Assemblymen in touch with each other's actions, the Senate and the Assembly
generally work together in accomplishing legislation. Of course, this may mean that a
measure which has significant popularity may be passed by one house as a "sop" to its
popularity but then defeated by the other house, or detained in joint committee because the
true temper of the legislature is against the measure. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
Whether this sort of compromise is desirable as a check and balance or whether it is con-
sidered a "monkeying" with the bicameral institution, it is clearly an indication that Senate
and Assembly achieve the common good in New York by working together. And it also
shows that the similarities of both houses (for example, that members of both houses are to
be chosen according to population) must be put to work constructively, and also that their
dissimilarities, whatever they be, must be valid and serve a useful purpose in government.
182. See, e.g., the Report of the Special Committee on the Constitutional Convention of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York entitled "Legislative Apportionment,"
April, 1967, at 8.
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